A few weeks ago my friend Zblurx pushed a PR to Impacket in which he implemented the Channel Binding Token computation based on code that was developed by @lowercase_drm for the ldap3 library. This PR allowed any tool relying on the ldap3 library to be able to connect to LDAP servers even if LDAP signing and LDAPS channel binding are enabled. Looking at the code I thought it would be…
WinRM is protected against NTLMRelay as communications are encrypted. However WinRMS (the one communicating over HTTPS) is not entirely. That said, WinRMS is not configured on a default server installation (while WinRM is). So, if someone tried to harden their servers’ configurations (by removing the HTTP endpoint), they would open a new possible target that can be used to relay HTTP/SMB and LDAP NTLMv1 only authentications to WinRMS and thus…
On the 31st of October 2022, a PR on CrackMapExec from Thomas Seigneuret (@Zblurx) was merged. This PR fixed Kerberos authentication in the CrackMapExec framework. Seeing that, I instantly wanted to try it out and play a bit with it. While doing so I discovered a weird behaviour with the Protected Users group. In this blogpost I’ll explain what the Protected Users group is, why it is a nice security…
When I got a new MacBook with an M1 Pro chip, I was excited to see the performance benefits. The first thing I did was to fire up hashcat which gave an impressive benchmark speed for NT hashes (mode 1000) of around 9 GH/s, a solid doubling of the benchmark speed of my old Intel MacBook Pro. But, when it came to actually cracking things, the speed dropped off considerably.…